Abstract. We present the new block cipher SHARK. This cipher combines highly non-linear substitution boxes and maximum distance separable error correcting codes (MDS-codes) to guarantee a good di usion. The cipher is resistant against di erential and linear cryptanalysis after a small number of rounds. The structure of SHARK is such that a fast software implementation is possible, both for the encryption and the decryption. Our C-implementation of SHARK runs more than four times faster than SAFER and IDEA on a 64-bit architecture.
Introduction
The best known and most used block cipher today is the DES FIPS46] . The operation of the DES can be described in the following way: the message input X is divided into two halves X 1 and X 2 . These halves are then processed in 16 rounds. The odd-numbered rounds perform the following transformation:
Y 1 = X 1 F(K; X 2 ) Y 2 = X 2 ; while in even-numbered rounds:
Y 1 = X 1 Y 2 = X 2 F(K; X 1 ) : After the last round, both halves are swapped. This structure is called the \Feistel structure " F73] . Many proposed alternatives for the DES use the same structure, which has the nice feature that it is invertible for all choices of the F-function. An important weakness however is that each round transformation always keeps one half of the block constant. This fact is used in many attacks, SHARK is resistant against these attacks.
In Sect. 2 we explain our design strategy and select components for SHARK.
Section 3 gives some cryptanalytic benchmarks. In Sect. 4 we make some remarks about the implementation, and Sect. 5 discusses further work.
Design Strategy
In our design strategy the round transformation is composed of three distinct building blocks:
{ a non-linear layer (e.g., substitution boxes); { a di usion layer; { a key scheduling to produce round keys from the key.
The design strategy assigns to each of these components a function. The components are selected to ful ll this function in an optimal way. By considering each building block separately, we get a robust cipher. We select a di usion layer with uniform and good di usion properties. The nonlinear layer has uniform nonlinear properties, such that when measuring the resistance of the cipher against cryptanalysis we don't have to take the details of the interaction between the non-linear and the di usion layer into account. If, for example, the S-boxes are replaced by other S-boxes, with equivalent nonlinearity properties, the resistance of the cipher remains constant. This strategy is a variant of the wide trail strategy D95]. Since each building block is selected and examined separately, it is not attempted to compensate weaknesses of the non-linear layer by additional properties of the linear layer.
In the remainder of this section we de ne a clear criterion for each of the building blocks and make design decisions. The S-boxes are m{bit permutations. The number of parallel S-boxes is denoted with n, and the number of rounds with R. Fig. 1 shows the general structure of SHARK. Note that this gure represents the conceptual structure, which di ers slightly from the actual implementation.
The gure shows that SHARK consist of R rounds with a key addition, nonlinear substitution, and a di usion layer. This is followed by an extra key addition and an extra di usion layer, which is the inverse of the round di usion layers. The purpose of the extra key addition is to prohibit an attacker from peeling o the last round. The extra di usion layer is needed for an easy implementation of the decryption. This will be explained in Sect. 4. 
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Di usion Layer
For the design of the di usion layer, we consider the m-bit outputs of the S-boxes as elements of GF(2 m ). The di usion layer takes n m-bit values as input, and gives n m-bit outputs. The purpose of the di usion layer is to provide an avalanche e ect, both in the context of di erences and linear approximations. In the linear context this means that there should be no correlations between linear combinations of a small set of (m-bit) inputs and linear combinations of a small set of (m-bit) outputs. In the di erential context this means that small input changes should cause large output changes, and conversely, to produce a small output change, a large input change should be necessary (where we consider again m-bit values as inputs and outputs). For an invertible linear mapping , this e ect can be quanti ed by its branch number B D95].
Denote by w h (a) the Hamming weight of a, i.e., the number of non{zero components of a. These components can be bits, as in D95], or elements from GF(2 m ) as here. Then B( ) = min a6 =0 (w h (a) + w h ( (a))) :
B gives a measure for the worst case di usion: it is a lower bound for the number of active S-boxes in two consecutive rounds of a linear trail or a di erential characteristic (we will de ne the term active S-boxes in Sect. 3). Since a cryptanalyst will always exploit the worst case, this is a good measure for the di usion property. Note that w h (a) n, for every choice of ; if w h (a) = 1, this implies that B n + 1. We call an invertible linear mapping for which B = n + 1 optimal.
The framework of linear codes over the eld GF(2 m ) gives us an elegant way to construct a di usion layer with optimal branch number. A linear code C of length n, dimension k, and with minimum distance d between the codewords is denoted as an (n; k; d){code. An (n; k; d)-code is a k-dimensional subspace of the vector space of n-tuples over GF(2 m ). The Hamming distance between two codewords is equal to the number of elements in which they di er.
A linear code can be represented by a generation matrix G k n . This matrix has dimensions k n, and is always of full rank. C is formed by the subspace of dimension k that is spanned by the rows of G.
The generation matrix of a code is not unique. If G is a generation matrix of C, then every matrix G 1 = T k k G, where T k k is of full rank, is also a generation matrix of C. The matrix G e = T G = I k k B k (n?k) ] is called the echelon form of G. Proposition 1 Let C be a (2n; n; n+1){code over the Galois eld GF(2 m ). Let G e be the generator matrix of C in echelon form:
G e = I n n B n n ] : Then C de nes an optimal invertible linear mapping :
: GF(2 m ) n ! GF(2 m ) n : X 7 ! Y = B X : Proof: First we show that B = n + 1. The de nition of B gives:
(w h (X; (X)):
It follows from the de nition of that all the 2n{tuples (X; (X)) are codewords of the code C. The minimumof the Hamming weights of the non{zero codewords is by de nition equal to d = n + 1. We prove by contradiction that is invertible. Suppose is not invertible. This This is in contradiction with B = n + 1.
The branch number of a di usion layer is very important. In K96], Knudsen breaks ve rounds of SAFER, making use of the low branch number of its diffusion layer (the Pseudo Hadamard Transform). The low di usion of the DES is used by Matsui M93] to construct a linear approximation of the cipher with high correlation.
Substitution Boxes
Non{linear S{boxes provide resistance against linear and di erential cryptanalysis. A large amount of criteria, which are sometimes con icting, have been published (see, for example, C94, DT91, KMI91, N91, N94]).
The exor table E of a mapping is de ned as follows BS90]: E ij = #fxj (x) (i x) = jg : High entries in the exor table can lead to di erential characteristics with a high probability making the cipher susceptible to a di erential attack.
In N94] Nyberg proposes several classes of non-linear substitution boxes. For SHARK, we choose an S-box that is based on the mapping F(x) = x ?1 over GF(2 m ). This class of S-boxes has the following properties (when m is even):
{ Di erentially 4{uniform. This means that the highest value in the exor table equals 4. In fact, every row of the exor table contains exactly one 4, the other possible values are 2 and 0.
{ Minimal distance to an a ne function is 2 m=2 . { The non-linear order of every linear combination of output bits equals m?1. This is the only class of mappings of N94] that can be used for boxes with dimensions 2 m 2 m , with m even. In order to remove the xed points 0 ! 0, and 1 ! 1, we apply an invertible a ne transformation to the output bits.
The disadvantage of these boxes is that they have a simple description in GF(2 m ), which is also the eld in which the di usion layer is linear. This may create uneasy feelings, but we are not aware of any vulnerability caused by this property. For the time being we challenge cryptanalysts to demonstrate any vulnerability caused by this property. Should such a vulnerability exist, one can always replace the S-boxes by S-boxes with similar properties, that are not algebraic over GF(2 m ).
Key Scheduling
The key scheduling expands the key K to the round keys K i . A good key scheduling produces round keys with maximal entropy.
First we present two alternative ways to introduce the round key in the round function: one is a simple exor of the round key with the input, the second is a key controlled a ne transform. Then we explain how these subkeys are generated from the key.
Exor The nm input bits of the round are exored with nm key bits. This method is fast and uniform: there are no keys that are stronger or weaker in the sense that the di usion and the non{linear layer have the same properties for all keys. This notion of weak keys is the same as in DGV94]. A disadvantage of the simple scheme is that the entropy of the round key is at most nm.
A ne Transformation Let i be a key dependent invertible (n n){matrix over GF(2 m ). De ne the key operation as: Y = i X K i : This operation is still linear and thus it introduces no weak keys. Each round now introduces more key material, raising the entropy of the round keys to O(mn 2 ). The computational overhead of this operation is very large. We can restrict i to a certain subspace, for instance let i be a diagonal matrix. The entropy of the round keys then becomes close to 2mn. In Sect. 4 it will be explained how to implement this variant in an e cient way.
Subkey generation Many attacks on iterated ciphers rst recover (part of) a round key. This knowledge is subsequently used to recover other round keys and/or the key. To make these attacks less e cient, one can generate the round keys by hashing the key with a preimage resistant function, like in Blow sh S94] or CAST AT95].
In SHARK, the round key generation is as follows. The R +1 mn-bit values K i are initialized with the rst R+1 entries of the substitution table T 0 , which is de ned in Sect. 4. The matrices i are initialized to the unit matrix I. The user selected key is then concatenated with itself until it has a length of 2(R + 1)mn bits. This is used as input of SHARK in 64-bit CFB mode ISO10116]. The 2(R + 1)mn output bits are used as the actual round keys for the encryption of the message: the rst (R + 1)mn bits are the values K i , the next bits are interpreted as (R + 1)n elements of GF(2 m ) and form the diagonal elements of the i . If one of these elements is zero, it is discarded. Subsequently all the following values are shifted down one place and an extra encryption of the allzero string is added at the end.
While this mechanism for subkey generation in principle makes it possible to use a key of 2(R + 1)mn bits, we suggest that the key length should not exceed 128 bits.
Resistance Against Di erential and Linear Cryptanalysis
In a di erential characteristic, S-boxes that have a non-zero input exor are called active S-boxes; these S-boxes produce the required output exor with a certain probability. The S-boxes of SHARK are chosen such that this probability is at most 2 2?m . Inactive S-boxes have a zero input exor and consequently they have always a zero output exor. The di usion layer ensures that two consecutive rounds have in total at least B = n + 1 active S-boxes.
In a linear attack, the cryptanalyst tries to nd correlations between linear combinations of input bits and linear combinations of output bits. S-boxes from which some input bits and some output bits are involved in the linear combinations, are called active S-boxes. S-boxes from which no input or output bits are involved in the linear combinations, are called inactive S-boxes. Assuming that the inputs to di erent S-boxes are independent, we can calculate the correlation by multiplying the correlations for the active S-boxes. The correlations in SHARK's S-boxes are at most 2 1?m=2 , which means that every active S-box increases the amount of needed texts by a factor of at least 2 m?2 M93].
The dimension of the S-boxes m, and the number of parallel S-boxes n have both been chosen equal to eight. This means that the resulting cipher works on message blocks of 64 bits. We propose the cipher with six rounds. For applications that require only 40 bits security, four rounds may su ce. Table 1 gives some numerical values for the probabilities of the best possible di erential characteristics and squared correlations for the best linear approximations as a function of the number of rounds R, compared with the values for the DES. Not that since the DES is a Feistel cipher, the number of rounds has to be doubled to obtain a fair comparison.
Note that a cryptanalyst who attacks an R-round scheme doesn't need an R-round approximation or characteristic. One can assume that for SHARK an (R?2)-round characteristic or approximation can be used. Also, the probability of the best di erential can be several times higher than the probability of the best characteristic. Equivalently, the correlation between input bits and output bits of the cipher is only approximated by the product of the correlations in each round. It is clear that for a 64-bit cipher with a xed key the probability of a di erential is larger than 2 ?63 , or it is equal to zero. Also the correlations between input and output bits are multiples of 2 ?63 . More speci c, in a 64-bit block cipher the expected value for the probability of a di erential is upper bounded by 128 2 ?64 O94]. The probabilities and correlations in the table were calculated by assuming independent and variable round keys; they are probabilities over the input and round key space. These values give only an indication of the safety margin against linear and di erential attacks. When the probability of a characteristic or the correlation of a linear approximation drops below 2 ?63 , it can be considered as irrelevant. For applications where a conservative security margin is much more important than encryption speed, one can use more rounds. If one uses the \prob-abilities" and \correlations" of 
Implementation Considerations
First we show how to combine the S-boxes and the di usion layer in one operation. Then we show how the structure of SHARK enables us to exploit this feature both in the encryption and the decryption mode. Let X 1 ; : : :; X n denote the input of a round, after the key addition, and let Y 1 ; : : :; Y n denote the output. We have: Here the S i are the m m substitution tables, \ " and \ " denote addition and multiplication in GF(2 n ), and A is the matrix that de nes the di usion layer. We can write this as follows: 2 6 This operation needs only n table lookups and n?1 bitwise additions and shifts (of nm-bit values).
The key addition can be incorporated into the S-boxes as well. Addition with a xed key before a substitution table is equivalent to a simple rearrangement of the rows of the table. In the case of the key dependent a ne transform it is even more important for the performance to incorporate the key operation into the substitution tables. If is a diagonal matrix, this operation is again equivalent to a rearrangement of the rows of the substitution table.
A nice property of the Feistel structure is that encryption mode and decryption mode of the block cipher are very similar: only the order of the round keys has to be reversed. For SHARK the conversion from encrypting mode to decrypting mode is a bit more involved. We explain now how the round keys and the combination of the S-boxes and the di usion layer have to be modi ed for the decrypting mode. The function of the inverse di usion layer at the end of the cipher becomes clear. 
where r denotes the combined S-box-di usion operation. Since the key addition and the di usion layer are both linear operations, we can interchange their order: 
The last equation is actually implemented. The equation contains R This equation has the same structure as the encryption operation, as given by (4).
Performance
Since SHARK operates on 64-bit words, it will bene t from a 64-bit architecture. If one incorporates the key addition into the S-boxes, key-dependent S-boxes are the result. However these key-dependent S-boxes have no \weak keys" where one can nd di erentials with high probability V96].
Because of the guaranteed di usion, there are no good characteristics or linear relations. Therefore we expect to obtain a higher resistance against linear and di erential cryptanalysis with a smaller number of rounds.
The modular design allows for easy extension of the cipher to a 128-bit cipher. This can be done by doubling the number of parallel S-boxes n, or by doubling the input size of the boxes m. A simple calculation shows that the resistance against cryptanalysis is higher for the scheme with doubled m. However, S-boxes with input size 16 impose high memory requirements, and therefore a doubled number of boxes n seems a better choice. For both schemes it is easy to nd an RS-code that can be used in the di usion layer.
